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What’s left of the Italian Left? 
 
JAMES L. NEWELL 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The 2008 election has left the impression that the Italian Left is in extreme difficulty, yet assessing this 
view is rendered difficult by uncertainty about what groups it includes. Taking as the relevant membership 
criterion the pursuit of actions to extend equality, enables one to make the assessment by exploring – in the 
arenas of party competition, public opinion and pressure groups – the obstacles in the way of, and the 
opportunities for, these actions. In the arena of party competition, prospects for equality will increase with 
the election of a government of the centre left, whose strengths include the presence of parties strongly 
committed to egalitarianism, and a solid electoral base. Weaknesses include disunity, and an inability of 
egalitarian parties to pursue their goals when in government; opportunities, the centre right’s dependence 
on Berlusconi, and its divisions; threats, the centre right’s advantages in permanent campaigning. In the 
arena of public opinion the prospects for equality and the Left are facilitated by egalitarian attitudes, offset 
by the salience of single issues on which attitudes are highly in-egalitarian. In the pressure-group arena, 
prospects are facilitated by the growth of associational activity and protest. Optimism, not pessimism is 
therefore appropriate given that the pursuit of equality will always be difficult even in the most favourable 
of circumstances. 
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Introduction 
 
When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe there was a plethora of debates about the 
future of the Left and about whether it any longer existed as an historical phenomenon, or 
even as a meaningful concept (Bobbio, 2004: 64-65). Something not dissimilar has 
happened on a smaller scale in the wake of the Italian general election of 2008, the 
outcome of which, for the first time in the history of the Republic, left Parliament without 
a single member claiming to represent the socialist or communist traditions. The purpose 
of this paper is therefore to examine the current strengths and weaknesses of the Left and 
the structure of opportunities and constraints now confronting it; to explore what 
contribution it has made to bringing about the circumstances in which it finds itself, and 
what this has to tell us about the prospects of it realising any of the significant items on 
its agenda at any time in the near future.  
 
Doing this may help to shed light on a major conundrum in Italian politics. This is 
that despite the advent of bipolarity and alternation in government a decade and a half 
ago, the Left does not, at any time since, seem to have acquired any more power and 
influence than it had in the days when it was permanently excluded from government. 
Under the First Republic, the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, PCI) 
was regularly the second largest party with an average vote of 27.2 percent between 1953 
and 1987; but the Cold War dread of communism meant that it was never able to place 
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itself at the head of a coalition capable of offering an alternative to governing coalitions 
built around the Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, DC). With the early 1990s 
transformation of the party system and its consequent ‘unblocking’ – in large part the 
consequence of the end of the Cold War and the main opposition party’s acquisition of 
eligibility for government through its own transformation – the prospects for the Left 
should in theory have improved dramatically: after all, it could now compete on equal 
terms with the Right in a way that it could not do previously. Yet coalitions involving the 
Left have, unlike their rivals on the centre right, never won a convincing election victory 
and in terms of votes, have trailed the centre right at every election but one (Table 1). So 
there is a need to find out why this is.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In carrying out this task our concern will be very much to seek understanding, 
where our use of this term is not innocent. That is, we think it important to account for 
the phenomena we seek to analyse by aiming to render intelligible, from the point of view 
of those involved, the action in which the phenomena are rooted; that is, by seeking to 
make sense of the meaning that actors themselves attach to their action. This is very 
important in discussing the Left, where too often political actors are condemned for 
behaviour (for example, fragmentation and a lack of unity) that would not attract such 
condemnation were greater efforts made to appreciate how the actors involved perceive 
the situations in which they find themselves. There seems to be no good reason for 
assuming that they are stupid and unable to see what academic observers can see so 
clearly! Before we engage with any of these issues, however, we need to define our 
terms. 
 
What’s Left in Italy 
 
What must be included among those making up ‘the Left’ in Italy? Does it include the 
Democratic Party (Partito Democratico, PD), many of whose members would not accept 
the label for themselves? Does it include the Green Party? Does it include the movement 
of protest against the so-called Gelmini reform in the autumn of 2008? On the one hand, 
this might be included as the latest manifestation of a ‘new opposition’ whose centre of 
gravity is in the social movements; whose most dramatic expression to date has been the 
2001 anti-capitalist protest in Genova; whose adherents have been driven by themes of 
social justice, traditional to the Left. On the other hand, it might be excluded for the 
strong anti-political vein in it and its challenge to the authority of the parties of the centre 
left. Does the category include some or all of the trade unions? Does it include the 
growing number of non-governmental, voluntary and co-operative associations, whose 
acts of civic engagement – in the context of a prime minister seeking explicitly to use 
Parliament to pursue laws with no apparent purpose beyond the resolution of his private 
legal difficulties – inevitably carry connotations of opposition to conventional politics 
and to the status quo? We think that the problem is best resolved by defining the Left less 
in terms of the organisations and groups that compose it, than as an idea or outlook to 
whose advancement a wide range of organisations and groups may contribute at different 
times.  
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A convenient starting point for the definitional task is therefore Norberto 
Bobbio’s well-known classic, Destra e Sinistra (2004). Bobbio argues that what 
distinguishes the Left from the Right is a different attitude towards the ideal of equality. 
To be on the Left does not mean to aspire to the equality of everyone in every respect – in 
any case impossible – but to want greater equality – where this obtains the larger the 
number of people to whom resources or rights are distributed; the larger the number of 
categories of resources or rights distributed; the less restrictive the criteria used for the 
distribution. Thus universal suffrage is more equal than male suffrage; social and liberal 
democracy more equal than liberal democracy alone; the acquisition of adulthood more 
equal as a criterion for the distribution of political and social rights than the acquisition of 
property. In turn, the egalitarian aspiration stems from the belief that while humans are, 
as a matter of fact, equal in some respects and unequal in others, what is more important 
for their happy coexistence is what they have in common. To be on the Right, therefore, 
means to emphasise the value of inequality, that is, to start from the same recognition of 
the facts and to argue that what is more important for happy coexistence is what makes 
humans different. Concomitantly, to be on the Left is to argue that most non-trivial 
inequalities are social in nature and therefore easily eliminated. To be on the Right is to 
argue that they are rooted in nature, tradition or the past and therefore eliminated only 
with difficulty, if at all.  
 
In some but not all cases – Bobbio’s argument continues – extending equality 
requires restricting freedom since it requires the imposition of a regulation to bring it 
about. This makes it possible to identify, alongside equality and inequality, the dyad 
liberty and authority, distinguishing those within the categories of Left and Right: Thus to 
be on the far Left is to be willing to sacrifice liberty for equality. To be on the centre Left 
is to have a commitment to both ideals. To be on the centre Right is to have a 
commitment to liberty but to equality only insofar as it amounts to equality before the 
law. To be on the far Right is to deny the value of both liberty and equality. 
 
 This analysis enables us to sidestep the problem of the organisations and groups 
to enumerate among the Italian Left, by offering a basis on which slightly to refocus the 
question we started with. Bobbio’s argument suggests that the degree of equality is 
something that can in principle be objectively measured. This makes it reasonable to 
assess the current state and future prospects of the Left by asking not about the 
performance and so on of this or that organisation or group rather than others, but rather, 
by asking what appear currently to be the main opportunities for and the obstacles in the 
way of the extension of equality, whoever its specific protagonists may be. With this in 
mind, the remainder of this paper is devoted to an analysis of such opportunities and 
obstacles in each of three arenas: that of party competition; public opinion; pressure-
group activity. 
  
The party-political arena 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the prospects for an extension of equality will increase if, 
at the next election, the parties of the centre left are able to oust the current incumbents 
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and take over the reins of government themselves. This assumption makes it possible to 
carry out a SWOT analysis. As is well known, such analysis is used to inform strategic 
planning for the achievement of an end-state or objective, by providing information on 
the organisation’s strengths and weaknesses (attributes of the organisation helpful and 
harmful to achieving the objective) as well as the opportunities and threats facing it 
(attributes of the environment helpful and harmful to achieving the objective). 
 
Strengths 
 
These include the presence, among the parties of the centre left, of organisations like 
Communist Refoundation (Rifondazione Comunista, RC), the Party of Italian 
Communists (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, PdCI) and the Movement for the Left 
(Movimento per la Sinistra, MpS). It will seem strange to list the presence of these 
groups as ‘strengths’; for they are small and quarrelsome (Figure 1). They are included 
because their commitment to the extension of equality is the firmest among the centre-left 
parties and because together they took 6.5 percent of the vote in the 2009 European 
elections – thereby confirming that, though they had been expelled from the national 
parliament in the 2008 election, they had not ceased to be a force in the electorate and 
that at least some of the supporters they had lost on that occasion would return to the fold. 
The result was still quite a bit below the parties’ combined result at the 2006 election 
(10.2 percent) and at the previous European election (11.0 percent) in 2004, but it has to 
be judged in the context of the considerable damage the 2008 election outcome had done 
to them: without a parliamentary presence they risked being ignored by the media; and 
having suffered such a haemorrhage of votes they found that the money available to them 
through the system of public party funding fell from €51 million in 2006 to €13 million  
(Lopapa, 2008). This was bound to have significant organisational repercussions for them 
bearing in mind that RC, for example, relied for fully two thirds of its resources on the 
system of public funding (Bertolino, 2004: 323).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 True, the parties were divided at the 2009 elections and this meant that neither of 
the two lists they presented cleared the four percent exclusion threshold the Government 
and main opposition party, the PD, had agreed to in February. But the division and its 
consequences need to be correctly understood. In the first place, it found its origins in the 
post-mortem that took place after 2008 and especially in the division that emerged at 
RC’s national congress in July 2008. Then two positions emerged. One was that of Nichi 
Vendola, president of the Puglia region, who felt that at the 2008 election the Rainbow 
Left (la Sinistra l’Arcobaleno, SA), the electoral coalition bringing together RC, the 
PdCI, the Greens and the Democratic Left (Sinistra Democratica, SD), had been 
unsuccessful because it had been a discordant federation. What was needed was a 
constituent process uniting all those parties willing to rethink fundamentally what being 
on the left now meant. By overcoming division, such a pluralistic organisation would, by 
virtue of its size, enable profitable engagement with the other large parties in the Italian 
political system, and find an interested audience among pressure-group activists, in the 
trade unions and among the new social movements. Vendola was the principal instigator 
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of the Sinistra e Libertà coalition in 2009. However, at the party’s July congress, his 
position, with 47 percent of the votes, had been beaten by that of ex-Social Welfare 
minister, Paolo Ferrero, with 53. Ferrero became the principal instigator of the Lista 
Anticapitalista. His view was that inherent in Vendola’s position was a danger of the 
liquidation of the party – whose organisational reinforcement was on the contrary 
necessary if one were to avoid the twin danger of left unity being deprived of specific 
horizons, and the risk of conflict among the potential constituent parties over what the 
nature of the new organisation was to be. On the face of it, neither of these views was 
unreasonable. 
 
 Paolo Ferrero explained very clearly the reasons why two separate lists were 
being presented at the European elections, in a letter published on the Lista 
Anticapitalista web site on 4 June 2009 (http://www.unaltraeuropa.eu/dett-
blog.php?id_blog=11). These included the point that it could not be assumed that unity 
was inevitably a winning formula. It was, again, not an unreasonable position to take – as 
political scientists ought to be aware; for whether unity between two parties must 
necessarily bring them more support than if they take to the field separately depends on 
whether unity can attract additional voters beyond those already supporting the parties 
concerned; and it also depends on whether these existing voters will transfer their support 
to the united entity (which they may resist doing if they are strongly attached to their 
existing party but dislike the one(s) with which their party unites). They may be 
especially resistant where the process of unity creates internal conflict over what the 
identity of the united entity should be. The PD could certainly not be said to have avoided 
such conflict – so how much less reasonable was it to expect it of parties like those of the 
radical left, whose actions are much more heavily constrained by the attachment to 
normative principles of various kinds? 
 
 A second strength for the centre left is the relatively solid electoral position from 
which it might grow. Again, this might seem a strange assertion to make: in 2008 it lost 
almost 3.5 million electors as compared to 2006 and the component with any chance 
whatsoever of forming a government trailed Berlusconi and the centre right by nearly ten 
percent. However, the result must also be viewed in the context of previous outcomes and 
what was reasonable to expect. Given the unpopularity of the outgoing government, no 
one expected the centre left to win. Under these circumstances, in managing to enlarge its 
reservoir of support to 37.5 percent of the vote (as compared to the 33.6 percent the Ulivo 
and Italy of Values (Italia dei Valori, IdV) had won in 2006) ‘the PD/IdV coalition…did 
not perform badly’ (Chiaramonte, 2008: 200). And though the centre right won 
resoundingly, its victory came about largely because of the change in political supply (in 
breaking with the Union of the Centre (Unione di Centro, UDC), Berlusconi was subject 
to a potential loss of support that was smaller than the potential loss to which Veltroni 
was subject in breaking with the radical left) and because most of the 3.5 million electors 
the centre left lost abstained – ‘as can be deduced both from the fall in turnout (down to 
80.5 from 83.6 per cent) and from the first estimates of the flow of the vote made on the 
basis of both ecological (De Sio, 2008a) and individual-level data (Feltrin and Natale, 
2008)’ (Chiaramonte, 2008: 200). Few of those who failed to vote for the centre left 
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switched to the centre right.1 Consequently, though Berlusconi’s share of the vote rose (to 
46.8 percent from the 40.6 percent the parties making up his coalition had obtained in 
2006), in terms of actual votes his coalition had some 800,000 more than the constituent 
parties had had two years earlier (Chiaramonte, 2009: 202) – hardly an insuperable 
obstacle to have to surmount. 
 
Weaknesses 
 
Fairly obviously, the most significant difficulty the centre left faces in seeking to 
surmount that obstacle is overcoming the divisions that stand in the way of building a 
coalition with a sufficient to degree of unity to be credible as a potential alternative 
government. In 2007 and 2008, Veltroni sought – through the creation of the PD, first, 
and his decision to contest the election (almost) without allies, second – to bring into 
being a party capable of dominating, if not monopolising the political ground to the left 
of the centre the way Silvio Berlusconi has been able to dominate the ground to the right. 
Thereby, he hoped to reduce the problems of alliance formation if not eliminate the need 
for alliances altogether. Instead, by inducing Berlusconi to make a corresponding move – 
so that, as at every Second Republic election but one, the main centre-left party once 
again came in second behind the main party of the centre right2 – Veltroni merely 
succeeded in providing confirmation that  alliances are indispensible if the centre right is 
ever to be beaten. 
 
And ironically, in bringing a reduction in party-system fragmentation, the PD’s 
strategy in the run-up to 2008 has in some respects increased the difficulties of finding 
unity on the centre left because of the contribution it made to the growth in significance 
of IdV. By leaving Antonio Di Pietro, in a much simplified party system, at the head of a 
radical party whose support had considerably grown, the election outcome ensured that 
he would be able to attract a level of media attention he had had to compete hard for as 
one of nine parties in the former government. This is turn meant that he had an 
opportunity not to be missed to consolidate and extend his party’s support by acting as a 
thorn in the side of the PD.  
 
It is for this reason that the period since the election has seen Di Pietro hard at 
work seeking to consolidate his image as a far more consistent and aggressive opponent 
of the incumbent government and prime minister than the PD leaders, often attacking 
them for timidity. The latter, in turn, perceive Di Pietro’s colourful focus on Berlusconi’s 
misdemeanours as cutting little ice with ordinary voters located beyond the centre left’s 
confines (who, they believe, look to the coalition to devote greater attention to the 
                                                  
1 As a percentage of the electorate, those who had voted for the centre left in 2006 but now voted for the 
centre right came to 4.3 percent – but they were counterbalanced somewhat by movements in the opposite 
direct, so net losses due to shifts from centre left to centre right came to only 2.1 percent. Meanwhile, those 
who had voted centre left in 2006 but now abstained amounted to 5.6 percent of the electorate (De Sio, 
2008b: 62). 
 
2 The election in question is the election of 1996 when Forza Italia (FI) took 7,712,149 votes in the 
proportional arena while the Democratic Party of the Left (Partito Democratico della Sinistra, PDS) took 
7,894,118 
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economy and social welfare). They also perceive Di Pietro’s style as one that assists 
Berlusconi; for, by allowing him to dub the opposition as a home to intolerance; and by 
allowing him to demand of the PD repudiation of its ally’s more strident 
pronouncements, it enables him, every time Di Pietro makes one of his more colourful 
outbursts, to embarrass the PD and drive a wedge between the opposition parties.  
  
For two reasons, the wedge is unlikely to get smaller in the short term. On the one 
hand, IdV and the PD clearly fish in the same pool of voters. This makes them direct 
competitors, and all the evidence is that in this competition, Di Pietro’s strategy brings 
him considerable success: he has understood that notwithstanding Veltroni’s decision in 
the 2008 campaign to abandon an ‘anti-Berlusconi’ style of opposition, such a style is, as 
the recent European elections suggest, what centre-left voters apparently want: thus, 
IdV’s vote rose to 8.0 percent from the 4.4 percent he had obtained in 2008, even while, 
at 36.5 percent, the combined support for the parties – the PD, IdV and the Radicali – that 
had made up the centre left coalition last year remained virtually the same (it was 37.5 
percent last year). On the other hand, the PD cannot refrain from taking its distance from 
Di Pietro because if it is to make any electoral headway whatsoever, then besides 
speaking successfully to radical spirits, it needs also to appeal to moderate elements 
located towards the centre of the political spectrum.  
 
If the principal weakness of the centre left then is its lack of unity, an additional 
factor weakening it as a vehicle for extending equality is the dilemma that confronts those 
most strongly committed to this ideal. The dilemma is clearly illustrated by the position, 
in the last Prodi coalition, that was occupied by RC – which in time-honoured fashion, 
had joined the government through processes of trasformismo, with consequences as 
devastating as those suffered by parties of the Left that had been caught up in such 
processes on earlier occasions. In many respects the trajectory taken by RC mirrored that 
of the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) in the early 1960s. Both 
were potential enemies of parties with a governing vocation, turned into allies of these 
parties through a process of cooptation. Neither party had any real control over the forces 
driving it toward government: each would have been condemned to political irrelevance 
had it turned its back on participation – and consequently neither was well placed to 
exploit its numerical indispensability for government survival to obtain the kinds of 
reforms of most concern to it.  
 
Once in government RC found that, if it sought to exploit its indispensability as a 
means of advancing the causes of most concern to its core supporters, then by appearing 
to put the survival of the government in jeopardy, it risked losing the support of more 
recently acquired but less strongly attached supporters.3 And indeed as one as one of nine 
parties every one of which was necessary for the survival of a government whose 
ideological span ran from clericalism to Trotskyism, it was constantly berated for 
behaving ‘irresponsibly’ by anyone in the media whose support for it was less than 
fervent. On the other hand, if it bowed to the resulting pressures, it was exposed to the 
                                                  
3 The potential losses were not insignificant: in 2006 its vote in the Chamber of Deputies election amounted 
to 2,229,464: 20 percent more than the 1,868,659 votes it had won in 2001. 
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criticism of core supporters who would immediately accuse it of having sold out.4 If such 
a notion would be damaging to it, then it was, on the other hand, terrified of bringing 
down the Government because of what it would have meant in terms of reminders of 
1998, when the first Prodi government had fallen and it had suffered enormous 
organisational and electoral damage through the split that had been the consequence.  
 
It was not surprising then that on a range of issues – from Afghanistan, to the 
Finance Law, pensions reform and the Government’s proposals concerning civil 
partnerships – RC found itself obliged to support measures it was unhappy with or which 
fell far short of what it would have liked. Nor was it surprising that at the 2008 election, 
the reaction of a large proportion of its former supporters was to abstain or vote for one 
of the minor parties of the extreme left (Buzzanca, 2008; Mannheimer, 2008; Corbetta, 
Marcotti and Vanelli, 2008) while another sizeable proportion apparently heeded 
Veltroni’s call to cast a ‘useful vote’ (un voto utile) by supporting the party (his own) best 
placed to stop Berlusconi. 
 
Opportunities 
 
In reflecting on opportunities, one’s attention is, logically, drawn to the weaknesses of the 
incumbent government and its leader. Silvio Berlusconi has acquired a position in Italian 
politics that is pretty-much hegemonic  – a position only slightly dented (perhaps by the 
Noemi Letizia affair) in the European election, which saw his party take 35.3 percent of 
the vote, somewhat below the average of 40.2 percent attributed to him by opinion polls 
from the end of February.5 On the one hand, he is the fulcrum around which the centre 
right is built; on the other hand, opposition to him is the only common denominator of the 
parties on the centre left. It thus remains the case, now as it was before the election, that 
‘to be on the centre right means to support Berlusconi, to be on the centre left means to 
oppose him’ (Urbani, 2009: 6). On the one hand, this is a source of weakness and 
division for the centre left; for while, until recently, the PD has sought to expand towards 
the centre by shelving anti-Berlusconi rhetoric, this has deprived it still further of any 
                                                  
4 Just one blog post will have to suffice to illustrate the kind of reaction with which RC compromises were 
often greeted: 
 
Rifondazione has been embalmed. Incapable of reacting to any of the attacks of the centrists. Full of 
hang-ups. It’s afraid that all its actions might bring a governmental crisis, but until now nothing of 
what has been proposed by Rifondazione has been discussed, the CPT are still in place, the Bossi-
Fini law is still in force, the Biagi law continues to damage the lives of millions of workers, 
educational reform is not discussed, the PACS have become DICO but no one says anything, 
infrastructural projects are being re-proposed by a di Pietro out of control, not to mention the war… 
For the sake of keeping Prodi on his feet, Rifondazione is prepared to expel even its senators. 
Between Rifondazione and the social movements a chasm is opening up. Rifondazione does not 
represent them any more. Words of an active member. What’s the point of keeping alive a 
government that pursues the policies of the right? (http:\\partigianamente.splinder.com/post 
/11297256) 
 
5 http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elezioni_europee_del_2009_(Italia) 
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clear identity leaving it vulnerable to the incursions of its allies to which many of its 
voters feel closer in any event (Diamanti, 2008: 1).  
 
On the other hand, it provides the centre left with a two-fold opportunity. First, 
since the success of Berlusconi is so central to the cohesion of the centre right, it means 
that the unity of its constituent elements depends very heavily on his continued popularity 
– and this leaves them naturally vulnerable. Ample confirmation of this was offered by 
the experience of the last Berlusconi government: as long as his charisma brought the 
coalition as a whole success, then it could remain united; but once his began to fade, then 
not unnaturally the constituent parties sought to shore up their own popularity by 
heightening the salience of core issues on which they conflicted: demands for social 
protection and state intervention, in the case of the southern-based UDC and National 
Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale, AN); welfare chauvinism and regional autonomy for the 
Northern League (Lega Nord, LN). And not unnaturally, every time Berlusconi seemed 
to falter, conflict – stemming from the aspirations of AN and the UDC to capture 
leadership of the coalition for themselves – was reinforced.  
 
In the second place, though Berlusconi’s position may not be immediately 
vulnerable, it has seemed so on the odd occasion since the start of the current media 
gossip about his private life.6 Especially in the lead-up to the G8 Summit, there was the 
sense, as he visibly struggled to defend himself against allegations of lying and against 
increasingly strident media satire, that he was beginning to loose control of events and 
that the international prestige of the country was being undermined as a result. The loss 
of authority that seemed to be the consequence appeared, to judge from press reports, to 
have as its concomitant, the appearance of cracks in the loyalty of his followers.7 
However this may be, what is almost certain is that Berlusconi, given his age, will leave 
the political scene in the next few years rather than any later. Then, it is reasonable to 
expect some turmoil on the centre right arising from the uncertainty this may create for 
the future of the People of Freedom (Popolo della Libertà, PdL) whose image and 
organisation, despite everything, seems to be very heavily dependent on the image and 
the power in it of the entrepreneur. 
 
 A second opportunity seems to be opened up by the current divisions on the 
centre right, divisions which may, paradoxically, have been fuelled by the efforts to give 
it greater cohesion through the formation of the PdL. One thinks here of the recent 
conflict over funding for the South, and the related initiatives – attributed to Sicilian 
regional president, Raffaele Lombardo, and PdL spokespersons Gianfranco Miccichè and 
                                                  
6 One hesitates to call it a ‘scandal’ as the revelations seem to have scandalised foreign observers more than 
they have ordinary Italians. 
 
7 See, for example, Guy Dinmore (2009: 9) in the Financial Times on 25 June: ‘Ministers are falling into 
several camps. Those whose futures depend on Mt Berlusconi surviving, are vocal in defending him… 
Women groomed by Mr Berlusconi – including Mara Carfagna (equal opportunities minister) and Stefania 
Prestigiacomo (environment) – are loyal, but in the current circumstances find it difficult to speak out. 
Then there are key figures who have largely kept silent, seeing a future beyond Mr Berlusconi while hoping 
any succession will be orderly… [For example] Giulio Tremonti, finance minister, has the advantage of 
close ties with the Northern League’.  
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Antonio Martino – for the creation of a new Party of the South (Partito del Sud) (Sorgi, 
2009; Schianchi, 2009). And one wonders whether the conflict would have had quite the 
division and significance it appears to have had before the PdL came into being: in the 
past, political expressions of the north-south divide in Italian politics might have taken 
the form of conflict between AN and the UDC on one side and the LN on the other, 
enabling Berlusconi and FI to pose as mediators, holding the ring and keeping the parties 
together. Now, with the merger between FI and AN, and with the UDC out of the 
coalition altogether, the conflict cannot but appear as a division within Berlusconi’s own 
party, with the concomitant result of rendering the entrepreneur himself more vulnerable 
than he might otherwise have been. 
 
 Further divisions were opened up by the salvos launched by Umberto Bossi and 
the LN in July and August 2009 concerning the teaching of dialects in northern schools; 
giving the same constitutional status to regional flags as to the national flag; wage 
differentials (gabbie salari) as between those employed in the northern and southern parts 
of the country. In many respects, the LN is, like the parties of the radical left, an ‘outsider 
party’ (Deschower, 2004) needing to tread a path that lies between sustaining the 
Government in office, and acting as an ‘opposition in government’. Like IdV, the LN 
fishes in the same pool of voters as its putative ally: flow-of-the vote charts show that in 
2008, by far the largest portion of its striking advance was made up of those who two 
years previously had voted for FI, AN or the UDC (De Sio, 2008b: 65). Consequently, its 
spokespersons have an incentive to seek media attention by means of outbursts the nature 
of which cannot but be such as to sow divisions within the PdL given the ‘composite’ 
nature of the larger party. Such actions enable the LN to reassure core supporters it has 
not sold out, but do have the tendency of reducing government stability (Rosso, 2009: 3).    
 
Threats 
 
Arguably, the LN cannot afford to ‘rock the boat’ too much without the risk of its actions 
backfiring on it. If, consequently, the Government is able to retain the much greater 
degree of cohesiveness compared to its predecessors that it has shown hitherto, then it 
will wield an armament very dangerous for its adversaries; for under those circumstances, 
it will be much better placed than its predecessors to engage in that permanent 
campaigning – using support mobilisation as a key resource for governing, while using 
governing as an instrument to build and sustain support – that is essential for survival in 
mediated democracies (Roncarolo and Belluati, 2008). The significance of this can be 
seen by comparison with the previous Prodi government which found that effective use 
of communication as a tool in the battle to control the political agenda was extremely 
difficult because it had to manage a coalition composed of large numbers of parties each 
driven to keep salient its own distinctiveness by the imperatives built into the 2005 
electoral law (Floridia, 2008). Not surprisingly, then, the government found it difficult to 
control the political agenda, and therefore the flow of communication. Thus it could do 
little to counter opposition portrayals of it as ineffective or, hence, the decline in its 
popularity. The Berlusconi government, with its coalition of two, and a cabinet in which 
the Prime Minister’s own party has an absolute majority, has difficulties that come 
nowhere near these in terms of order of magnitude.  
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 The consequences, in terms of the contrast in levels of popularity of Government 
and Prime Minister can be seen from the data presented in Figures 2 and 3. While at the 
start of Berlusconi’s mandate 53 percent had ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in him 
as Prime Minister, eight months on the proportion was 55 percent. The proportion 
expressing ‘a lot’ or ‘quite a lot’ of confidence in the Government as a whole has 
remained more or less stable at around a half. Now compare these with the proportions 
expressing confidence in Prodi and his government over the first eight months of their 
mandates. From Figure 3 we can see that though they start out from proportions actually 
higher than those marking the start of the current prime minister and government, the 
proportions then fall away rapidly to levels much lower than those enjoyed by the current 
incumbents. 
 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Public opinion 
 
To state the obvious, it seems unlikely that an agenda for greater equality will have much 
chance of success in the absence of both supportive attitudes among the public at large, 
and a willingness of those with such attitudes to support parties in a position to pursue the 
agenda. To enable us to explore these issues, Table 2 shows the results of a series of 
polls, which involved asking respondents for their opinions about a number of current 
issues. The polls were selected, from those made available by the Prime Minister’s office 
through the web site http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/, as ones which seemed 
likely to be most revealing of attitudes to equality. All have been undertaken since the 
2008 election. Responses in the category to the left (second and third columns) are 
assumed to reflect a positive orientation to the ideal of equality; responses in the category 
to the right (columns four and five), a less positive or a negative orientation. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Obviously, the utility of these data is limited. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that 
on four of the six issues, a concern for equality seems to outweigh the opposite 
orientation, and that the two cases where this is not true both relate to the issue of 
immigration. Also worth noting is that supporters of centre right and centre left are much 
more sharply distinguished in terms of their attitudes to this issue than in terms of their 
attitudes to the others. Thus 90.1 and 89.6 percent of supporters of the PdL and LN 
respectively, but only 41.9 and 44.1 percent of PD and IdV supporters respectively, think 
that the Government’s decision to turn away immigrants from Libya was right. By 
contrast, in relation to the issue of wage differentiation, the differences are much less 
marked: 60 percent of those who voted for the Pd/IdV coalition in 2008 worry that wage 
differentiation would increase the gap between North and South – but so do 49 percent of 
those who voted for the coalition headed by Berlusconi. Of course, the fact that the 
supporters of party A are more likely to take position X than Y than are the supporters of 
party B, does not on its own allow us to make the inference that those who take position 
X rather than Y are more likely to support party A than party B. However, the closer A 
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and B are to each other in size, the more entitled we are to make this inference and from 
other information at our disposal, we can be confident that the inference is valid in this 
case.8  
 
This points to the conclusion or the hypothesis that though by and large Italian 
voters’ outlooks incline more towards egalitarianism than towards in-egalitarianism, any 
advantage this brings to parties whose agendas are closest to the egalitarian end of the 
spectrum – the parties of the centre left – is counterbalanced by the effect of specific 
issues on which the balance of opinion is decidedly in-egalitarian. In other words, if the 
data suggest that those with egalitarian attitudes are on the whole more likely to support 
the centre left than the centre right, then issues like immigration almost certainly reduce 
what would otherwise be the benefit for the centre left: Attitudes on this issue are by-and-
large highly in-egalitarian; it is one over which the parties of the centre right have 
established ‘issue ownership’ (that is, they have built their political identity partly on the 
basis of it); it is one that, relative to other issues, carries a very high emotional charge – in 
part, it seems reasonable to suppose, because of the frequency with which, in public 
debate, immigration is linked with a similarly emotive issue, namely crime.  
 
The problems this state of affairs poses for equality and for the centre left are, one 
seems entitled to assume, magnified by the massive imbalance in access to the media as 
between centre right and centre left; for levels of public concern in these areas seem to be 
less closely related to changes in the underlying reality than to changes in the way the 
underlying reality is reported. In a recent article published in the newspaper la 
Repubblica, Ilvo Diamanti (2009) notes that public concerns were very high in the late 
1990s; that they subsided in the first five years of the new millennium; that they rose in 
the following two years, and subsided once again thereafter. And while 21 percent 
mentioned the fight against crime as the most important issue when deciding how to vote 
in 2008, only 12 percent did so in 2009. It is difficult to explain the coincidence of these 
variations with changes of government by appealing to changes in reported crime 
statistics, for these show trendless fluctuation since 1991 (and suggest that Italy is one of 
the safest countries in Europe). More likely as an explanation is changes in reporting: 
while the early evening news bulletins of the six main TV channels broadcast 3,500 items 
dedicated to crime in the second half of 2007, the figure fell to little more than 2,500 in 
the second half of 2008 and then to less than 2,000 in the first six months of 2009. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that if these disadvantages can be tackled, then the 
prospects for electoral change favourable to the Left appear quite good. In 2008, 
Veltroni’s coalition obtained 13,686,501 votes for Berlusconi’s 17,064,334. 5,025,028 
did not vote, voted for the centre right or voted for some other party, having voted for the 
                                                  
8 Working with Italian National Election Study data, Cavazza et al. (2008: 167) show that those for whom 
immigration is an especially salient concern were much more likely to vote for Berlusconi’s coalition than 
for the coalition head by veltroni (the relevant percentages being 77.2 and 12.3). By contrast, if 33.1 
percent of those for whom some form of economic insecurity was especially salient voted for Veltroni’s 
coalition, 48.5 percent of them nevertheless voted for the coalition headed by Berlusconi. 
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centre left in 2006.9 Had these people been persuaded to vote for Veltroni’s coalition, 
then, even without the support of the 1,855,840 who voted for one of the non-aligned 
parties of the Left, the former Communist leader would have won easily. There is little 
need to rehearse the limits of pencil-and-paper exercises of this kind. The point is that the 
number of voters potentially available to it is such that the Italian Left can win. To 
suggest, as Emiliano Brancaccio did in a recent roundtable in MicroMega (Revelli et al., 
2009), that the Left is confronted with the prospect of ‘a long and cold winter’ strikes me 
as unduly pessimistic.  
 
The pressure-group arena 
 
Measures conducive to greater equality can be pursued as much through pressure exerted 
upon the institutions of government from the outside, as through the autonomous 
initiatives of those staffing the institutions. So, given that to be on the Left means to 
pursue objectives, in whatever form, that will extend equality, our analysis will be 
incomplete without some reflection on what, aside from the party system and public 
opinion, is currently going on in civil society. 
 
Here we have seen in recent years a number of significant changes connected with 
the decline of the ‘red’ and ‘white’ subcultures and in the religious and ideological 
certainties of the Cold War period, which have created space for the growth of a ‘new 
associationism’. This has been expressed by a wide range of small groups, cooperatives, 
non-profit and volunteer organisations, ‘pragmatic, rather than ideological, inclusive 
rather than exclusive, non-violent’ (Ginsborg, 2003: 121). Between 1999 and 2003, the 
number of non-governmental organisations rose from 170 to 200, while between 2001 
and the end of 2003, the number of voluntary organisations rose by 14.9 percent. 
Meanwhile, between 2001 and 2004, the number of social cooperatives grew from 5,515 
to 7,100 (Censis, 2005: 14-15). The apparent growth in civic commitment seems to have 
been accompanied by a growth in protest activity, with the number of street 
demonstrations of various kinds rising from 3,576 in 2000, to 7,022 in 2004 (Censis, 
2005: 13). 
 
We would suggest that the two may well be different manifestations of a single 
phenomenon, that is, a growth in civic engagement or activity that in some way implies a 
commitment to the welfare of the collectivity. In the context of a populist politics – which 
has encouraged an individualism (rooted in familistic assumptions) that can and 
sometimes does spill over into instances of high-level corruption and collusion with 
criminal organisations – such commitment, we would suggest, carries connotations of 
opposition to the centre right, and adherence to egalitarian ideals. Of course, protest can 
be driven by all kinds of objectives, of the Right as well as of the Left. However, we are 
persuaded that the emergence of this ‘new opposition’ (‘new’ because it has often 
appeared to challenge the authority of the centre-left parties, uncertain how to respond) is 
left-wing rather than right-wing in character, partly because all the most high-profile 
                                                  
9 The figures refer to the majority premium arena and are calculated from the data for the 2008 election 
outcome provided on the Ministry of the Interior’s web site (http://politiche.interno.it/politiche 
/camera080413/C000000000.htm) and from the percentages given in Table 4.3 of De Sio (2008b: 62). 
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protests of recent years appear to have had such a character. One thinks, here, of the 
school-students’ protests against government-sponsored education reforms; the protests 
of the Girotondi; the enormous demonstrations and strikes against the proposals of 
second Berlusconi government to abolish article 18 of the Workers’ Statute; protests 
against the war in Afghanistan; the European Social Forum; the protests against the 
invasion of Iraq, with their rainbow-coloured ‘peace flags’ hung from innumerable 
balconies up and down the country; the protests, in Val di Susa, against the proposed 
high-speed rail link between Lyon and Turin. 
 
The most significant of waves of protest since the 2008 election have been the 
ones that took place in October and November last year following the publication of 
government proposals, which have since become law, for the reform of schools and 
universities. There were, in a range of major cities, a number of street demonstrations, 
involving occasional clashes with the police. There were also strikes and occupations of 
university buildings, the biggest single set of protests probably taking place on 30 
October when the trade unions brought school and university staff out on strike and there 
were protest marches in several cities, with the one in Rome  involving  a million people 
according to the organisers. 
 
We think that this heightened level of activism speaks positively to the prospects 
for equality and the Left because of what appears to be the relative efficacy of protest as a 
form of political activity in Italy. On the one hand, the long-standing weakness of the 
state (whose roots can be traced back at least as far as Unification itself) has on several 
notable occasions in the post-war period led the authorities, under pressure to give proof 
of the ability effectively to remain sovereign within their territory, to manage protest 
repressively (one thinks here of the policing of street demonstrations in the 1950s, and 
the strategy of tension in the 1970s). However, perhaps because of the very same 
weakness, the authorities have also historically been rather receptive to the substantive 
demands of protestors. One thinks, to take some of the most famous post-war examples, 
of the following. 
 1969 and 1970, in the immediate aftermath of the workers’ and students’ protests, 
saw 
o improvements to the pensions system;  
o the passage of the so-called Workers’ Statute (which among other things 
established the right of workers to meet and organise at their places of work);  
o the introduction of divorce and the legislation necessary to give effect to the 
constitutional provisions providing for the establishment of decentralised (i.e. 
regional) government and for abrogative referenda. 
 In 1976, the movement for urban renewal was successful in obtaining passage of law 
no. 278. This increased the opportunities for popular participation in local decision-
making by providing for the election of decentralised, neighbourhood councils in 
municipalities of over 30,000 inhabitants. 
 In the course of the 1980s, a large number of the social circles set up in the wake of 
the youth movement of 1977 gained official recognition as associations able to fill a 
number of the gaps in the provisions of the welfare state. A number of the circles 
even received public subsidies (Della Porta, 1996: 47, 79, 82). 
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Finally, it is worth suggesting that the success of any protest movement is likely 
to be positively correlated with the degree to which it is successful in establishing links 
with significant party-political actors, able to act as effective spearheads for the 
protesters. Perhaps the main reason why the anti-Gelmini protests died out rather rapidly 
and seem to have had no lasting consequences is precisely because they failed to do that. 
On the contrary, as a journalist seeking to provide a sketch of the outlooks of the students 
noted,  
 
Of Italian politicians there is not a single mention. [There is] opposition to the 
centre right and diffidence towards Veltroni and the Pd (Portanova, Riva and 
Schiavulli, 2008: 79). 
 
One student declared: ‘Let them not try again to take charge of the protest; it won’t be 
accepted’ (e non provino ancora a metterci il cappello sopra, non passa) (Portanova, 
Riva and Schiavulli, 2008: 79). This reflected a very strong anti-political mood in the 
protest movement that was summed up well by Filippo Andreatta, Professor of 
International Relations at the University of Bologna. When asked whether he thought the 
anxieties expressed by the student protestors were closer to being existential or political, 
he replied: 
 
I would say a pre-political anxiety. I see in it the lack of any hope rather than a 
political objective. Unlike in 1968, the protest has not been ignited by any 
ideology. It is directed against the political class as a whole, which is not seen as 
representative of the country at large (Portanova, Riva and Schiavulli, 2008: 75). 
 
The significance of this is that a movement that goes beyond a certain point in rejecting 
politics must, surely, weaken itself by undermining its ability itself to act politically. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we have sought to do in this paper is quite simply to take what evidence is most 
immediately available about the current features of party politics, public opinion and 
pressure-group activity in Italy to see what it suggests to us about the current state of the 
Left and its prospects, on the assumption that its apparent current weakness invites 
attempts to account for it. Our overview has to a large extent been of an impressionistic 
nature, but it has, we think, thrown up some specific suggestions that might now be 
explored in a more rigorous fashion (e.g. through the analysis of the 2008 ITANES data, 
which has just become publicly available); and it has thrown a question mark over the 
assumption of Left weakness itself.  
 
For at least two reasons, it is at least highly doubtful that the Left is significantly 
weaker now than it has been at various times in the past. First, if the terms ‘Left’ and 
‘Right’ refer to attitudes towards the ideal of egalitarianism, then our impression is that 
those involved in the pursuit of objectives that will increase equality, currently have 
significant party-political and electoral resources they can count upon, as well as a 
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number of potential opportunities in the weaknesses of the centre right and in a vibrant 
civil society. It cannot be automatically assumed that the prospects for left-wing party 
actors are bleaker now than they were two years ago when they were burdened with the 
responsibility of sustaining an unpopular government and under constant attack from 
putative allies to the right on the one hand, and from disappointed core supporters on the 
other.  
 
Second, casting one’s mind further back, one is reminded that once Italy had a 
large communist party with over thirty percent of the vote and a deep-rooted left-wing 
sub-culture in the central regions of the country; today the subculture has almost ceased 
to exist as such and parties with the communist label struggle to achieve a fraction of the 
vote of the PCI. But in terms of egalitarian demands once controversial but now taken for 
granted, it is obvious that the Left is immeasurably stronger today than when the PCI was 
at its height. It is enough to think of the significant advances that have been made over 
the past thirty years in terms of gender equality, in terms of the equality of those of 
different sexual orientations, of those belonging to different ethnic groups, of those at 
different stages of the life-cycle and so forth. 
 
Of course those who are on the Italian Left in terms of their self perceptions will 
understandably argue that much remains to be done, and that the likelihood that a 
government will take office in the near future with anything like an incisive agenda in 
these and other areas of inequality seems small. One cannot but concur with both points. 
But one also feels moved to suggest that pessimism must be tempered by the awareness 
that the pursuit of equality will always be difficult even in the most favourable of 
circumstances. There are at least two reasons for this. One is that as compared to the 
Right, the Left is significantly handicapped by the much greater difficulty it has in 
achieving unity. In seeking to defend the extant against demands for greater equality, the 
Right has room for considerable ideological flexibility. The Right thus has  
 
an enormous unifying capacity because it is open to the most unprincipled cultural 
adventures and the most audacious importations. The left, by contrast, requires 
clarity of thought, theoretical rigour, and is thus lacerated by recurring, violent 
ideological conflicts because it conceives of the movement in terms of its 
inescapable relationship with theory (Terzi, 2003: 61).  
 
In the second place, the principle of liberal democracy itself massively advantages the 
Right. By institutionalising political conflict and by offering formal political equality 
while remaining indifferent to substantive inequalities in the distribution of power, it 
automatically disadvantages those seeking redistribution; for on the one hand, it renders 
illegitimate any political project whose pursuit fails to respect its own institutional 
principles. On the other hand, by virtue of the substantive power imbalance itself, it 
erects considerable barriers in the way of the construction of a majority that would allow 
the pursuit of redistribution by means that are deemed legitimate. Unless the Left is 
willing to put aside some of its awe of liberal democracy – to incline (in terms of 
Bobbio’s four categories) less towards the centre left and more towards the far left – then 
it will continue, in Italy as elsewhere, to face an uphill struggle.  
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Table 1: Chamber of Deputies election results, 1994 – 2008 
 
 Majoritarian arena 
 N votes % votes N votes % votes N votes % votes 
 Centre left Centre right Others 
1994 12,614,738 32.8 Polo 15,179,764  
AN 2,561,546  
39.4 
6.7 
8,148,110 21.1 
1996 Ulivo 
15,729,124  
Prog. 1,000,244  
 
42.2 
2.7 
 
Polo 15,028,275 
League 4,038,511  
 
40.3 
10.8 
 
1,508,969 
 
4.0 
2001 16,284,443 43.7 16,936,038 45.5 4,004,342 10.8 
 Proportional arena 
 Centre left Centre right Others 
1994 13,298,244 34.3 17,944,799 46.4 7,474,000 19.3 
1996 13,017,475 34.7 19,775,087 52.7 4,696,765 12.5 
2001 12,976,189 35.0 18,433,911 49.7 5,673,061 15.3 
2006 19,497,354 49.6 19,367,032 49.3 343,028 0.1 
2008 PD/IdV 
14,088,968 
SA 1,152,781 
 
37.5 
3.1 
 
PdL/LN17,394,890 
UDC 2,131,759 
 
46.3 
5.7 
 
2,771,899 
 
7.4 
 
Sources: figures for 2001 and 1996 elections taken from ‘Riepilogo elezioni politiche’, 
http://brunik.altervista.org/20030922221253.html; figures for 1994 elections taken from 
http://www.rassegna.it/elezioni/indice.htm and from 
http://elezionistorico.interno.it/liste.php?tp=C&dt=27/03/1994&cta=I&tpEnte=A&tpSeg=C&numEnte=&s
ut1=&sut2=&sut3=&descEnte=&descArea=ITALIA; figures for 2006 elections taken from Chiaramonte 
(2008); figures for 2008 elections taken from Chiaramonte (2009). 
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Table 2: Public attitudes on issues related to equality 
 
Question Response category % Response category % 
Dario Franceschini has proposed that 
measures to tackle the crisis should 
include the payment of a monthly 
unemployment cheque, by the State, to 
those who lose their jobs  
In favour 60.0 Against 37.0 
     
Cohabiting couples should have the same 
rights as married couples 
Agree 58.1 Disagree / don’t know 
/ no answer 
41.9 
     
Would you agree with the idea of giving 
the right to vote in local elections to 
immigrants who have been settled in the 
country for some years, have a steady 
job and pay taxes? 
Yes 52.6 No 39.8 
     
With which of these statements do you 
most agree? ‘Differentiating wages and 
salaries in different areas of the country 
in relation to differences in the cost of 
living would  
increase still further the 
gap between North and 
South and increase 
poverty in the southern 
regions’  
50.0 be a resource for the 
South by leading 
firms to invest where 
the cost of labour is 
lower’  
37.0 
     
Do you agree that clandestine 
immigration should be made a crime? 
No 30.0 Yes 68.0 
     
Recently, the Government turned away a 
boat bringing immigrants from Libya. In 
your view, was this decision 
Wrong?  25.6 Right? 67.5 
 
Note: the difference between 100, and row totals is accounted for by ‘don’t know’ / no answer. 
 
Source: http://www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it/: IPR Marketing (10 August 2009); Demos&Pi (21 May 
2009); Demos&Pi (30 March 2009); ISPO S.R.L. (9 March 2009); CRESPI RICERCHE (5 September 
2008); IPSOS Public Affairs (28 May 2008). 
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Figure 1: Alliance formation and division among the parties of the ‘radical left’, 2006 – 2009 
 
General    General         European 
Election 2006    election 2008         election 2009 
 
 
SD 
(5.5.2007) 
 
SA 
3.1% PdCI 
RC 
Greens 
SD 
 
Lista Anticapitalista 
3.4% 
Movimento per 
la Sinistra 
(25.1.2009) 
Socialismo 
2000 
(10.10.2008) 
Unire la 
Sinistra 
(8.2.2009) 
RC 
5.8% 
PdCI 
2.3% 
Greens 
2.1% 
DS 
17.2% 
Margherita 
10.5% 
    
PD 
(14.10.2007) 
 
Sinistra e 
Libertà 
3.1% Partito 
Socialista 
(5.10.2007) 
Consumatori 
Uniti 
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Note: 
 
Ovals indicate independent parties and organisations 
Squares and rectangles indicate electoral coalitions 
Full arrows indicate majority shifts 
Broken arrows indicate minority shifts 
 
Abbreviations: 
 
RC  Rifondazione Comunista 
PdCI  Partrito dei Comunisti Italiani 
DS  Democratici di Sinistra 
SD  Sinistra Democratica 
PD  Partito Democratico 
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Source: IPR Marketing, www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it 
Figure 2 Percent with 'a lot' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in Berlusconi as PM and in his government 
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Source: IPR Marketing, www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it 
Figure 3 Percent with 'a lot' or 'quite a lot' of confidence in Prodi as PM and in his government 
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